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LET THEM FRYE: FRYE HEARINGS FOR
DETERMINATION OF “MENTAL
DISORDERS” IN THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PERSONS ACT
Hannah Henkel*
Specific laws aimed at the confinement of mentally disabled sexually
violent persons have existed for years. Originally, these laws aimed to
rehabilitate a person within a mental hospital and help him with his
disorders, aiming to help him enter back into society. However, throughout
the years, the laws morphed into ways to keep convicted criminals from
society after their prison sentence ended for fear of potential future crimes.
In Illinois, the courts find a man falls within the sexually violent persons law
when he remains too dangerous to be released after his criminal confinement.
A person must have a “mental disorder” to fall under this law, and questions
remain on how these disorders are established. In Illinois, a psychologist
often makes a “mental disorder diagnosis.” This Comment argues the state
should have the psychologist qualified as an expert using a Frye hearing
before the expert can classify the person with a “mental disorder” within the
sexually violent persons law. This way, the person is classified using a legal
classification, not just the prevailing psychological definition of the day.

* J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2016; B.A. University of Illinois,
Champaign-Urbana, 2013. Thank you to all of the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
editorial staff, and especially Jeff Wysong who read so many drafts and helped me create the
final product. Special thanks to Allison Fagerman of Pignatelli & Associates, P.C., who
inspired this comment.
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INTRODUCTION
Innocent until proven guilty: it is a precept of the American legal
system. However, for some, laws impose incarceration merely because the
person has potential to commit harm based on prior acts. People’s entire lives
are placed under strict legal scrutiny to determine if they remain too
dangerous for society. If they remain dangerous, the result is incarceration,
and people remain there until they prove they are safe to return to society.
The United States has two forms of confinement: civil and criminal.
Criminal confinement deals in punitive law: courts impose punishment upon
guilty persons based on a specific prior act (actus reus) and a sufficient mental
state (mens rea) for each element enumerated in the violation.1 Civil
confinement, however, deals in civil remedies; areas of the court’s discretion
where the punishment is not specifically punitive, but relates to court
procedures and shielding people from harm.2 While the court’s use of civil
1

People v. Karberg, 826 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2005).
Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 Hastings
2
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remedies is typically based in restitution, civil confinement is used as a
punishment, or to proactively stop a person from doing something the court
deems illegal.3 A judge generally imposes civil confinement when the issue
deals with a person 1) violating the rules of the court, 2) failing to comply
with a judicial finding, or 3) remaining too dangerous for release after his or
her criminal confinement.4
The Sexually Violent Persons Act in Illinois (hereinafter “SVPA”) is
within the third category of civil confinement: a person remains too
dangerous to be released and return to society.5 When the state determines a
particular inmate is dangerous, the attorney general brings civil charges under
the act. Typically this happens right before the inmate is released. If a jury
finds the defendant guilty for uncertain future bad acts, he becomes a “postconvicted criminal.”6 Generally, the SVPA aims to prohibit a person from
returning to society if he has a mental disorder and presents a high risk of
recidivism due to his disability.7 An inmate falling under the SVPA remains
in custody within the Department of Human Health and Services (hereinafter
“DHS”) until a judge finds him safe to move into society.8
Although the SVPA deals in civil remedies, because the issue arises
L.J. 1325, 1343–44 (1991).
3
See id. at 1344–45.
4
Id. at 1362–67.
5
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 207/1–99 (West
1999). This is different than the “Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,” where a person is charged
during their criminal conviction to supplant their current prison status, not a civil sanction that
comes after serving a prison sentence. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/1.01 (West 1955). Although
the SVPA does not distinguish between men or women, I will use the term “he” as all cases I
discuss involve men. See generally Ross A. Brennan, Note, Keeping the Dangerous Behind
Bars: Redefining What a Sexually Violent Person is in Illinois, 45 Val. U. L. Rev. 551, 558–
59 (2011).
6
Term of art used by people explicating this notion of completed time and then a
subsequent conviction. Within the SVPA, generally the criminal is up for release when the
State’s Attorney’s Office files charges under the SVPA. Therefore, the person is put on a
subsequent trial after their incarceration would be over, i.e. “post-conviction.” Conversation
with Allison Fagerman, Attn’y at Law, Attn’y for Richard Mohr, (see infra note 164); In re
Anderson, 11 N.E.3d 445, 447–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (discussing persons background and
prior bad acts that resulted in him being an SVP); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/9 (West 2007).
7
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1–99 (West 1999).
8
See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/40 (West 2013). This is not the same as a criminal
conviction, but a civil confinement that is the “exception to the general rule that individuals
should only lose their freedom through their own actions.” Lance L. Losey, Comment, The
Sexually Violent Predator Act—A Dangerous Alternative, 8 Regent U.L. Rev. 123, 128 (1997).
Because it is based on the dangerous potential future acts, it is not about their own actions but
the safety of the community. Id. at 127.
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under confinement, the courts add elements of criminality, including “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt” that the person falls under the SVPA.9 For a state
inmate to fall under the Illinois SVPA, the state must charge and prove: 1)
the person was convicted of a sexually violent offense; 2) the person suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and 3) the mental
abnormality makes it likely he or she will commit future acts.10 The Illinois
legislature defines “mental disorder” as “a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to
engage in acts of sexual violence.”11 Illinois’s SVPA allows both the state
prosecuting the person under the Act and the defense to diagnose the person
with a mental disorder during the proceedings using medical experts, i.e.
psychologists.12
This Comment addresses the issue that courts often take the
psychologist’s views of mental disorders as factual when the psychologist
uses the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (hereinafter “DSM”). The DSM
establishes criteria to diagnose various mental illnesses; it is widely used in
the mental health profession.13 However, a psychologist’s diagnosis of a
“mental disorder” under the DSM fails to differentiate general mental
illnesses from “mental disorders” sufficient to satisfy the second element of
the SVPA. To prevent the very confusion problematic for judge and juries,
this Comment uses the term “mental illness” to indicate various diagnosed
disorders listed in the DSM based on a psychologist’s professional
evaluation. The term “mental disorder” is limited to conditions satisfying the
SVPA’s prong of finding a man has a “mental disorder,” which has its own
statutory language and legal definition.14 Thus, while the DSM’s definition
of mental illness is an important part of the process of finding a mental
disorder, it should not satisfy the element of “mental disorder” without any
further inquiry. Such confusion can lead to men being imprisoned after their
time served, regardless of if they have a legal “mental disorder” or not.
Because the courts often fail to differentiate the psychologist’s
subjective definition of “mental illness” from a legal “mental disorder”
determination, this Comment argues courts in Illinois should have Frye

9

See Losey, supra note 8, at 143,
Id.; see also In re New, 992 N.E.2d 519, 527 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013).
11
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/5(b) (West 2013).
12
See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/15(f) (2014); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/25(e) (West 2011)
13
American Psychiatric Association, Introduction to Diagnostic And Statistical Manual
Of Mental Disorders 5 (5th ed. 2013).
14
See infra, Part II.B.
10
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hearings to ensure psychologists are experts by determining if the
psychologists’ diagnoses of “mental illness” under the DSM are applicable
to the SVPA.15 A Frye hearing looks at a psychologist’s tests and diagnoses
and determines that a psychologist’s opinion has general acceptance within
the field of psychology, qualifying the psychologist as an expert witness for
testimony.16 Under the Frye hearing suggestion, Illinois courts would be able
to determine what constitutes a “mental disorder” under the SVPA and what
falls under a mental illness with the DSM.17
Part I of this Comment addresses the SVPA, its implementation, its
purposes and goals, and the inherent liberty issues the statute raises. It moves
on to explain why a “mental disorder,” as defined by the SVPA, includes
various ambiguities and gives psychologists no specific direction in their
diagnoses. Further, the section looks at the DSM, its use as a legal device,
and problems associated with equating its definition of “mental disorder” as
a legal “mental disorder” without question. The distinction is paramount due
to the SVPA’s definition of mental disorder being statutory language, and the
DSM being a psychologist’s general diagnostic tool.
Part II analyzes Frye hearings, directly looking at psychologists’
methods and tests for determining a mental illness, including how the test
affects the “mental disorder” determinations under the SVPA. The section
further analyzes the movement in Illinois to use Frye hearings to determine
if the person being charged under the SVPA has a mental disorder.
Part III analyzes current Illinois court findings on Frye hearings and
movement in favor of allowing a hearing for expert opinions. While
discussing the general overview of Illinois cases, it focuses on the current
Illinois case for SVPA in the Frye context, In re New.
Lastly, in Parts IV and V, this Comment takes the preceding parts and
reexamines how important true “expert testimony” is to show that an
individual has a mental disorder and he is more likely than not to commit

15

See generally W. Wylie Blair, Comment, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act:
The Civilly Committed and Their Fifth Amendment Rights, or Lack Thereof, 29 S. Ill. U. L. J.
461, 463–64 (2005).
16
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
17
For purposes of this Note, I am focusing specifically on Illinois law and its use of Frye
Hearing tests. In other courts using the Frye Hearing, some things may hinge on the language
of the statute. The Federal tests for experts is the Daubert standard. See infra, notes 95–96.
See also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Because there are “twilight
zones” of evidence where expert testimony is actually a scientific principle or discovery
instead of merely experimental, there needs to be evidential force to support admission to the
court.
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future acts under the SVPA. In the end, the SVPA should ensure that those
who are charged under the Act are provided correct procedures. When
discussing the overarching issues, I look at actuarial methods determining
risk of recidivism and their required Frye hearings to reinforce the
Comment’s overall argument of implementing the hearings for expert
testimony.
I. THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS ACT: ITS IMPLEMENTATION, ITS
PURPOSE, AND THE INHERENT LIBERTY ISSUES THE STATUTE RAISES
Part I deals with the SVPA and its original implementation, discussing
the initial purpose of the Act to help those inflicted with a mental disease. It
then looks at the changes that occurred over time, warping the intensions of
the initial statute and morphing the law to protect society against potential
threats. It moves forward to describe psychologists’ purpose in SVPA trials,
and their reliance on the DSM and issues that arise under the social document.
It ends by looking at the inherent liberty issues with the developing laws
created after sexually violent persons acts’ renewed popularity in recent
years.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS ACTS

“Special Commitment” laws first came into effect in the 1930s.18 By the
1960s, more than twenty-five states adopted them, often terming them
“sexual psychopath laws.”19 In the beginning, these laws aimed to place
specific people in involuntary psychological hospitals because they were “at
high risk for recidivism but at the same time good candidates for treatment.”20
Courts confined men falling under the acts into a hospital to aid them with
their mental disorders.21 However, hospital confinement began to create
issues in a states because men received early release from the hospital and
went back into society, lessening their criminal sentences without proper
process.22 Other states felt that the acts failed to do what they promised: to
protect society from criminals and the acts only gave mental help for the

18

Brennan, supra note 5, at 556.
Dangerous Sex Offenders, A Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric
Association 11–12 (American Psychiatric Association ed.1999) [hereinafter “Task Force
Report”).
20
Id. at 11.
21
Id. at 11–13.
22
Id. at 14–15; citing American Bar Association: Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards. Commentary to Standard 7–8.1, at 459.
19
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“social misfits” who fell under the acts.23 By 1990, “all but 12 states and the
District of Columbia had repealed their sexual psychopath commitment
laws.”24
Between 1993 and 1999, state legislatures began resurrecting SVP laws
after a man, Earl Shriner, raped and castrated a seven-year-old boy two years
after a release from a ten-year sentence for assaulting and kidnapping two
teenage girls.25 Shriner pleaded guilty to the kidnapping years before, but he
pleaded innocent to the castration of the boy.26 The second crime led to uproar
in the community.27 Because of Shriner’s release of his first crime, and
subsequent criminal activity with the boy, there was a resurgence in sexually
violent persons acts.28 These new acts focused on protecting society by
incarceration after time-served rather than focusing on rehabilitation of the
offender during incarceration.29 Illinois implemented similar sexually violent
persons laws that provided for commitment after completion of a criminal

23
Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 14 (internal citation omitted). Originally repealed
because, as the Group of the Advancement of Psychology (hereinafter “GAP”) stated,

. . . sex psychopath and sexual offender statutes can best be described as approaches that have
failed. The discrepancy between the promises in sex statutes and performances have rarely been
resolved. . . . The notion is naïve and confusing that a hybrid amalgam of law and psychiatry can
validly label a person a ‘“sex psychopath’” or ‘“sex offender’” and then treat him in a manner
consistent with a guarantee of community safety.

Id. at 14. The history of sexual psychopath laws hinged on six assumptions mentioned in the
American Bar Association’s commentary, specifically:
1) There is a specific mental disability called sexual psychopathy; 2) Persons suffering from such
a disability are more likely to commit serious crimes, especially dangerous sex offenses, than
normal criminals; 3) Such persons are easily identified by mental health professionals; 4) The
dangerousness of these offenders can be predicted by mental health professionals; 5) Treatment is
available for the condition; and 6) Large numbers of persons afflicted with the designated
disabilities can be cured.

Id. at 13.
24
Id. at 11.
25
Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 16–18; See Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling
Sexually Violent Predators: Continued Incarceration at What Cost?, 14 New Crim. L. Rev.
213, 214 (2011) (internal citation omitted) (noting the man was a mentally retarded parolee
who stated he planned to torture people, but yet could not be prevented. Lave also discusses
two other cases within Washington in 1988 that helped the SVP laws resurface).
26
Tacoma Sex Offender Faces Latest Charges in Mutilation of Boy, The SpokesmanReview, May 23, 1989, at B2.
27
Id. (“‘Sex offenders always re-offend’. . . ‘We (police) were very frustrated with him
because we were not able to do anything of significance.’”). The opinion finding him guilty is
unpublished. State v. Shriner, 70 Wash. App. 1073 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
28
Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 18.
29
Id.
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sentence.30
Many scholars argued these laws violated due process by keeping postconvicted criminals incarcerated when they had already served their prison
time, violating their liberty interests.31 However, these arguments failed. In
In re Young,32 the Washington Supreme Court ruled that such laws were
constitutional.33 The basis of the opinion hinged on the fact that sexually
violent person laws only applied to inherently dangerous sex offenders with
high risks of recidivism. The laws did not violate due process because the
grounds narrowly applied to specific, dangerous members of society.34 The
Supreme Court of the United States further solidified the conclusion that civil
commitment is constitutional.35 In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court
held a state law’s incarceration of a man post-time served did not violate
substantive due process.36 The Supreme Court felt there was no due process
issue because “only persons found to be ‘mentally ill’ were legitimate
subjects for commitment.”37 The Supreme Court noted that the SVP laws
were important because of their goal to keep inherently dangerous people
away from society.38
Implementation of the new sexually violent persons laws after these
cases focused on the issue of recidivism and determining who would be a

30

Id. at 11–12. Illinois was not the only one, but after the incident in Washington, many
states started to resurrect such statutes. Id.
31
See, e.g., Lave, supra note 25; Johnson, infra note 54; Grant H. Morris, The Evil that
Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1199 (2000); Andrew D.
Campbell, Note: Kansas v. Hendricks: Absent a Clear Meaning of Punishment, States are
Permitted to Violate Double Jeopardy Clause, 30 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 87 (1998); Eric S. Janus,
Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v. Hendricks: Lessons from Minnesota’s Sex Offender
Commitment Litigation, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1279 (1998).
32
In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
33
In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1003; Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 19.
34
Id. at 19–21 (discussing the use of mental disorder as terminology used in previous cases
such as State v. Post and State v. Oldakowski (internal citation omitted)); see also In re Young,
857 P.2d 989, 1003 (1993).
35
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347 (1997).
36
Id. (rejecting the argument “that by permitting [defendant’s] commitment upon a finding
of ‘mental abnormality,’ the law violated the Constitution’s substantive due process. . . .”);
Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 29.
37
Id.
38
See, e.g., id. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 347 (1997); see also Task Force Report,
supra note 19, at 29–30 (noting that Legislatures understood the court’s focus on
dangerousness and the narrowness of those who had mental disorders. They therefore shaped
SVP laws to follow both Kansas v. Hendricks and In re Young, focusing the issues on elements
like mental illness and the risks of society.)
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danger to society.39 Because one sexually violent crime is not more important
than another violent crime,40 the law aimed to differentiate inherently
dangerous people through their mental disorder.
B. SVPA IN ILLINOIS AND USE OF MEDICAL EXPERTS

Illinois defines a “sexually violent person” as:
[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated
delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually
violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers
from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage
in acts of sexual violence.41

This means the court removes a person to DHS after finding he is an
SVP through the judge or jury finding two factors.42 First, they must find a
“mental disorder.”43 Second, this mental disorder must place him at a higher
risk for recidivism because he cannot control his actions in the future.44
Courts rely on testimony of “medical expert witnesses,” often
psychologists retained by both counsels, to determine if the person suffers
from a mental disorder.45 Psychologists use their own tests and
assessments46—usually subjective tests or clinical assessments.47 They
testify under the Illinois Rules of Evidence as experts.48 Yet psychologists go
past the clinical assessments: psychologists diagnose a mental illness under
the DSM with a man on trial, and determine mental illnesses using their own
tool of the DSM. They then opine in court, as experts, that the person charged
under the SVPA suffers a legal “mental disorder” and estimate the risk of
recidivism due to this “mental disorder.”49 Courts rely on the psychologists’
39

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 347 (1997); Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 29–30.
See, e.g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1–99 (1993). The only prophylactic before the trial is
the right to an expert, the right to notice, and the elements that a person must fall. Id.
41
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/5(f) (2013).
42
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1–99 (1993).
43
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1–99 (1993).
44
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1–99 (1993).
45
See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/15(f) (2014); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/25(e) (2011).
46
Although psychiatrists may be used, they usually are not utilized due to the courts only
needing a diagnosis, not a medicinal diagnosis. David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of
Psychological Testing, 41 Fam. Ct. Rev. 199, 209 (2003) (describing the subjectivity in
various psychologist testing).
47
See, e.g., id.(describing the subjectivity in various psychologist testing).
48
Ill. R. Evid. 401.
49
See In re Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137, 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Ill. R. Evid. 401 (“[I]t was
‘substantially probable’ that defendant would sexually reoffend with acts of violence. . . .”);
40
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finding of a mental disorder. This determination, along with the evidence
brought by the prosecution about the person’s actions, guides the inquiry that
a man is too dangerous for society due to his condition and should be
confined to the DHS for treatment.50
The psychologist’s testimony is often pivotal to show the person
charged falls under the Act not only at the beginning of a trial, but also in the
trial’s aftermath when a man wishes to leave the DHS facilities. Once a man
falls under the SVPA, he remains in the DHS until the state can no longer
show he falls under the Act.51 After a court finds a person is sexually violent,
a psychologist periodically reexamines the person to see if he is
“rehabilitated” or the confined person petitions the court for conditional
release showing good cause.52 To move back into society, the court must find
there is enough new evidence that he is no longer a threat.53 Because a court
found he had a mental disorder at one time, the psychologist’s assessment is
imperative to show the man continues to fall under the SVPA.
C. THE DSM ASSESSMENT

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is an important medical tool for
psychologists for finding mental illnesses; however, the diagnostic tool is not
aimed to be a legal device. Thus, a psychologist may conflate when a “mental
disorder” means the person meets the legal definition or just meets the DSM
version.54 Such a confusion of definitions undermines the legitimacy of a
court’s determination under the SVPA.
When determining if a person has a mental disorder, psychologists often

see also Ill. R. Evid. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise. Where an expert witness testifies to an opinion based on a
new or novel scientific methodology or principle, the proponent of the opinion has the burden
of showing the methodology or scientific principle on which the opinion is based is sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
50
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/40(a) (2014) (“[P]erson to be committed to the custody of the
Department for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually
violent person.”).
51
See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/55 (2014).
52
Id. A hearing is required every twelve months or whenever the person requests. Id.
Despite this, a full hearing is not required to study the reexamination, a court may just look at
plain facts without speaking to the person and decide on those alone. Id.
53
See generally 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/55 (2014).
54
Rebecca A. Johnson, “Pure” Science and “Impure” Influences: The DSM at a Scientific
and Social Crossroads, 15 DePaul J. Health Care L. 147, 149 (2013).
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arrive at a diagnosis based on their “clinical assessment.”55 Clinical
assessments focus on the history of the person, their criminal acts, and any
predispositions for less inhibited behavior to determine if the person has
“specific sexual attraction to unusual behavior, nonhuman objects, or sexual
activities involving nonconsent.”56
Original arguments against using clinical assessments and allowing
experts to rely on the DSM generally because of initial due process concerns
have largely ended.57 Courts often accept the psychologist’s reliance on the
DSM because all psychologists generally utilize such assessments and tests
for their diagnosis, showing the tests are relied upon by psychologists and
therefore accepted in a court setting.58 However, this reliance by
psychologists does not look at the mental disorder versus mental illness
dichotomy. When clinically assessing prior acts for psychological
evaluations, psychologists often use the DSM as a starting point to classify
and give descriptions of psychological diagnoses and determine if there is a
mental illness.59 It is up to the court or jury to decide if this mental illness is
a legally sufficient mental disorder.
A large critique of the DSM is the fact that the DSM as a societal and
cultural critique, merely establishing what people see as psychopathology
during their society.60 Scholars point to the fact that disorders in the DSM
change and become normal behavior in society later on.61 Laymen do not

55

See Lave, supra note 25, at 231 (“In a clinical assessment, forensic psychologists and
psychiatrists conduct interviews, review case files, and perform psychological testing, and
then use that information as the basis for a clinical opinion of whether a person is likely to
reoffend.”).
56
Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 53. When reviewing the different clinical
assessments, interviewers look at child abuse reports, patient experiences, partial paraphilias,
specific paraphilias, disorders in social inadequacy, cognitive distortions, alcoholism, and
personality disorders. Id. at 50–53.
57
See generally Melissa Hamilton, Adjudicating Sex Crimes as Mental Disease, 33 Pace
L. Rev. 578, 590–95 (2013) (discussing how unsuccessful due process standards are often
unsuccessful).
58
See generally id. at 575–77 (discussing the conflation of law-psychiatry interface with
relying on unscientific principles due to acceptance of the overall social science).
59
Johnson, supra note 54, at 151, 155.
60
Johnson, supra note 54, at 159. With various critiques on the fact that categorization
does not work, there has been a higher expanse of using objective classification along with the
DSM as a beginning marker. Id. at 162. However, this brings up critiques such as a
psychologist trying to find specific issues in their objective analysis. This inculcates empirical
research into a schema of predisposing factors. Id.
61
See, e.g., id. at 167–70 (discussing how the DSM expands and allows for some
diagnoses to become “normal” later in life); Hamilton, supra note 57, at 557–58 (discussing
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understand that outside forces affects the DSM, and the DSM focuses on
what people view as abnormal or based on political voting on what is
abnormal.62 Because a definition of a mental illness is subject to change, the
initial determination used by psychologists for mental illness may not mean
a person has a mental disorder under the SVPA.
Furthermore, the psychologists’ updates, changes, and additions or
deletions to the DSM lead many to question the DSM’s inherent legitimacy
and correctness, especially considering people who discuss mental disorders
view the DSM as a “proverbial bible.”63 Changes in the DSM have shifted
from symptom-based diagnoses within a clinical practice to a common term
for use in pharmaceutical companies, federal grants, and insurance
companies.64 The language changed to laymen’s definitions that generalize
the psychologist’s diagnoses65 and make mental disorders easy to find when
psychologists are trying to determine a person’s mental illness.
The newest version of the DSM, the DSM-V, states that it is not for legal
66
use. “In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-V mental disorder
such as intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder),
schizophrenia, major neurocognitive disorder, gambling disorder, or
pedophilic disorder does not imply that an individual with such a condition
meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or a specified legal
standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility, or disability).”67

how paraphilias and paraphilic behavior depends on what is “normal,” how that changes
culturally, and how it vacillates).
62
Johnson, supra note 54, at 149–50, 153–54 (noting the different schools of psychiatric
thought between Emil Kraepelin and Sigmund Freud and how “Adolf Meyer, a leading
intellectual figure in early 20th century American psychiatry” chose the Kraepelin view to
look at the patient’s specific situations and made them generalizable, and discussing how there
was a specific view accepted on the outset and the American system now looks purely at
general diagnosis, accepting that instead of the other, more person-specific diagnosis).
63
Johnson, supra note 54, at 151. Johnson discusses the fact that the APA has created a
bible where the authors are seen as “gods” and there are various questions about if we have a
right to question its authenticity when created by an unquestioning person. Id.
64
See Johnson, supra note 54, at 158–64 (discussing broad issues with the DSM due to its
outside forces).
65
Johnson, supra note 54, at 152, 170–71. When looking at the SVPA, it is completely
inherent on finding a psychological diagnosis, and when the psychologists have laymen’s use
for purposes of the act, they are not rising to the importance and implications of civil
confinement but finding diagnoses based on very slimly reliable information. Id.
66
DSM-V, supra note 13, at xxxiii.
67
Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 54 at 188; citing Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental
Illness (1974). (“The APA argues that this misuse/misunderstanding will occur because of the
‘imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information
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The DSM-V goes on to state it could be “misused or misunderstood.”68
When courts allow the use of the DSM as evidence, they rely on medical
diagnoses based on the DSM variables, not on the true issue of the SVPA.69
DSM-IV-TR and the leader of the DSM-IV taskforce explicitly warn against
the use of the manual for forensic purposes, arguing that its “use in legal
contexts poses significant risks that the information will be misused or
misunderstood,” and yet it has been cited in over 5,500 court opinions.70
Although the creators of the DSM recognize that people outside the legal
profession use the DSM, the task force stated it would not change the DSM
for legal or other contexts because the goal should remain diagnosing and
treating people at a psychiatric level.71
The DSM has large ranges of diagnoses that raises question for using it
to prove “mental disorders” in the legal sense. For example, the DSM
includes diagnoses of mental illness that include depression, sexually violent
crimes, and chronic hair pulling.72 These are not all mental disorders
applicable to the SVPA, and yet courts often accept the expert’s reliance on
the DSM without a hearing or stipulation despite the over-inclusiveness of
mental illnesses.73 There is sharp contrast between pedophilia and chronic
contained in a clinical diagnosis.’ While clinicians should be interested in diagnostic
categories that aid in the design of treatment options, legal professionals should be seeking a
related but distinct set of information.”).
68
DSM-V, supra note 13, at xxxiii.
69
See Johnson, supra note 54, at 189–90. There are questions with “catch-all” categories
that a person who falls into one of these does not show the actual inter-rater reliability and the
actual heterogeneity of the different clinical diagnoses. Id. at 173. Contradictory to this, the
fact that there are many issues with different pathologies finding the same mechanisms to
diagnosis shows that the categories may be in silos that could be intermixed. Id. at 174.
Because the “silos” and different categories are mixed, the changes and adjustments in the
DSM often make diagnosing those who are sexually violent difficult. Maybe add cite here?
70
Johnson, supra note 54, at 188 (emphasis added). Dr. Allen Frances, head of the DSMIV task force has critiqued the proposed changes and the fact that they “did not predict the
legal reverberations of [the] slight change in wording: work group members do not understand
that the DSM is read differently by lawyers than by psychiatrists and other mental health
practitioners.” Id. at 190.
71
Id. at 150 (citing DSM-V Development: Frequently Asked Questions, Am. Psychiatric
Ass’n (2002), available at http://www.DSM5.org/about/Pages/faq.aspx). “[The APA] resist[s]
the influence of these ‘impure aims,’ arguing that revisions ought to be guided by scientific
concerns about the validity and clinical utility of the constructs rather than concerns about
social service eligibility, civil rights endangerment, and treatment reimbursement.” Id. at 149
(emphasis added).
72
Id. at 167.
73
See generally Johnson, supra note 54, at 168–69 (discussing that within the DSM III
change there were critiques of the use of “premenstrual dysphoric disorder” from feminists
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hair pulling, and a court would likely never find hair pulling as its mental
disorder “hook” to rule a man falls under the SVPA.74 However, it is not
always that simple. Under the DSM, there is also a mental disorder for
attraction to post-pubescent males between ages of 15–18, also known as
“hebephilia” or “paraphilia not otherwise specified, attraction to postpubescent males” (a version of PNOS, discussed below).75 Society knows
that sex with someone underage violates the law and is not accepted as a
norm, but is it inherently a mental disorder to act on such feelings? Is it a
mental disorder to violate a law? And who decides: courts or psychologists?
D. LIBERTY ARGUMENTS WITHIN THE SVPA

Scholars often worry about liberty issues when analyzing the SVPA,
focusing on the fact that people subject to the SVPA remain in confinement
“until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person.”76
“Under the Illinois act, a person is detained indefinitely in a prison, forced to
obey prison rules and procedures and intermingling with other prisoners,
even though they committed no crime.”77 In order to be released into society,
the state must show the person fails to fall within the statute.78 Although it is
the state’s burden, often the man must show that he has changed.79 Because
of the stigma and prejudice of a conviction under the Act, it is difficult for a
person to show he is not substantially probable to commit further acts if the
court has already found he is inherently dangerous.80 In fact, in most cases,
that it was used to marginalize and stigmatize a “normal woman” v. someone with a mentally
negative behavior). Ironically, this over inclusiveness may lead to “a cart before the horse”
situation, where a psychologist has specific thoughts on what he or she should be seeing and
equates certain things to the DSM framework instead of objectively finding that a person may
exemplify certain traits. See, e.g., John Tierney, Social Scientist Sees Bias Within, The New
York Times, Feb. 8, 2011, at D1 (discussing political biases within psychological groups and
arguing biased towards republicans); Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A
Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 Rev. of General Psy. 175, 176 (1998) (internal
citation omitted) (discussing the fact that human understanding tries to adopt opinions that
support it).
74
DSM-V, supra note 13.
75
See infra, Part II.B.
76
In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d 598, 611 (Ill. 2012) (citing 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/35(f)
(2008)).
77
See Blair, supra note 15 (discussing the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act but notes the
SVPA for its similar circumstances).
78
Conversation with Allison Fagerman, supra note 6; see, e.g., In re Stanbridge, 980
N.E.2d at 612. The state must show that he is still dangerous.
79
Conversation with Allison Fagerman, supra note 6.
80
See, e.g., Eric S. Janus & Emily A. Polachek, A Crooked Picture: Re-Framing the

2. HENKEL (JWM FINAL) (AUGUST 1 FINAL)

2017]

LET THEM FRYE

8/2/2017 9:52 AM

375

the risk of recidivism is much lower than initially assumed. 81
The person can request release through specific procedures and show he
no longer falls within the statute if: 1) the person has the Secretary of Human
Services determine he is no longer an SVP; 2) the person is determined to no
longer be an SVP by periodic examinations required under the Act;82 or 3) a
person petitions for discharge before the periodic examinations, is approved,
and then found not to be a SVP.83 A determination of complete rehabilitation
must contain new facts to support a conclusion that the defendant has
changed.84 Under Illinois law, a person may request conditional release;
however, all the state must show to prevent the conditional release is that the
person is substantially probable to commit further acts. It needs no new
evidence besides recommendations from former or current experts and the
defendant’s criminal record.85
Looking at all these issues, the SVPA’s inertia in favor of continued
confinement creates a significant hurdle for the inmate to clear. A man only
has his former conviction and his status as a prisoner to show at trial: there is
little information in such a controlled environment to determine if he will
commit further acts. This reality makes a proper determination of an initial
mental disorder, and not just a mental illness under the DSM, even more
important.
II. THE FRYE STANDARD
The above section parsed out the SVPA and its use of experts, along
with psychologists’ reliance on the DSM as their diagnostic tool as experts.
This section deals with Frye hearings and the issues they alleviate under the
SVPA. Because of the susceptibility that people have when an expert gives
an opinion, the Frye standard created a buffer between a person’s testimony
and the courtroom. This buffer allow the court to determine if the expert was
using acceptable tests within his field and therefore could give an opinion.
The SVPA utilizes psychologists’ opinion testimony in every case, and yet
courts fail to alleviate the discrepancies between a “mental illness” under the

Problem of Child Sexual Abuse, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 142, 144 (2009).
81
Id. at 162 (“First, studies with the strongest methodology show that the recidivism rate
for sex offenders is as low, and often lower, than re-offense rates for criminals convicted of
non-sexual crimes.”).
82
See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/55 (2014).
83
Id.; In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 611–12.
84
In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 612.
85
725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/60(c) (2014).
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DSM and a “mental disorder” under the law. In the past, the prevalence of
Frye hearings in the SVPA ebbed and flowed, but a recent Illinois decision
reinforces the protective needs of a Frye hearing.
A. “GENERAL ACCEPTANCE” WITHIN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY

Frye v. United States arose after the Washington D.C. Circuit Court
questioned the authenticity of an expert’s opinion about a lie detector test.86
In Frye, the government wanted an expert to testify that a lie detector test
accurately represented the defendant’s guilt because the defendant failed the
test.87 Naturally, the defense objected, due to the unreliability of lie detector
tests.88 It instead wished to tender its own witness showing the lack of
authenticity of a lie detector test and the court rejected the defense.89 The
circuit court held on appeal the expert testimony was invalid due to the fact
that the lie detector studies used by the “experts or skilled witnesses” were
unreliable and that “inexperienced persons” could form an unreliable
judgment on the study.90 It stated that a study needed validity in “science, art,
or trade as to require a previous habit or experienced study in it.”91 The expert
needed to show the lie detector test had previous use or reinforced studies in
the profession showing reliability.92 Due to the lack of reliability and the fact
lie detectors seemed more experimental, the court found an expert opinion
must gain “general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,”
before it could be used.93
With this case, the Frye standard was born, requiring an expert’s opinion
be based on scientific principle that is generally accepted within the expert’s

86

An expert was brought in asserting that the “blood pressure is influenced by change in
emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous
impulses.” Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. (internal citation omitted) (“the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are
admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for the reason
that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous habit
or experience or study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it.”)
92
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The court noted it was difficult to define where a “scientific
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages. . . .”
Id.
93
Id.
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field of study.94 In 1992, the Frye standard was superseded by the Daubert
standard in federal courts and some state courts; however, the general
acceptance was taken in as a factor of Daubert among other factors to test an
expert’s validity.95 Although the Frye standard is not used in all jurisdictions
today, Illinois implements it to evaluate experts’ tests and standards to
determine whether they are accepted within their field.96
The Frye standard assesses whether an expert opinion is based on
generally accepted principles before the court or a jury is permitted to rely on
the expert’s opinion.97 The Frye hearing allows an expert witness to state his
or her factual findings, and show the findings, along with their opinion,
relying on their education and research.98 Although the opposing side may
question an expert’s tests, opinions, and models, when the judge allows the
expert to testify, he or she is still tendered as an expert and allowed to state
various opinions on the stand.99 Because of this, courts utilize the
prophylactic Frye standard to protect the courtroom from incorrect testimony
or science that has yet to be studied and determined authentic.100

94

Id.
Factors included various areas such as scientific technique, if it had been tested, subject
to peer review, published, the theory or test’s potential rate of error, and general acceptance.
Id. The Daubert standard was thought to be an easier, liberal movement. See Joseph G. Feehan,
Life After Daubert and Kumho Tire: An Update on Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 88 Ill.
B.J. 134, 138 (2000). However, in implementations courts have become very conservative in
what Daubert experts can place into the courtroom for expert testimony. Contra Cassandra H.
Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1085, 1086 (2006).
96
The standard used in federal courts and numerous jurisdictions is the Daubert Standard.
Daubert put the federal test on expert’s testimony. This test found that Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 provided that the person must testify 1) scientific knowledge that 2) will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue, and to find this there must be “a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underling the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to
the facts in issue.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–93
(1993). The courts trusted federal judges to possess capacity to look at this review, and there
was no test but different factors that could be used. Id. at 593.
97
See Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 105, 106 (1993).
98
See In re Detention of New, 21 N.E.3d 406, 412 (Ill. 2014) (“[T]he test serves to prevent
the jury from simply adopting the judgment of an expert because of the natural inclination of
the jury to equate science with truth and, therefore, accord undue significance to any evidence
labeled scientific.”) (citing People v. McKown, 875 N.E.2d 1029, 1034 (Ill. 2007)).
99
Ill. R. Evid. 702.
100
See Giannelli, supra note 97, at 107 (“[M]”ere ‘assistance’ to the jury is the touchstone
of admissibility under Rule 702.”).
95
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B. FRYE HEARINGS AND THE SVPA

The DSM has inherent dangers in the courtroom. To view the use of the
DSM as a legal tool to determine a mental disorder, one can look to the main
diagnosis used more often than not by psychologists for the SVPA:
determination of a paraphilia, an all-encompassing diagnosis that affects how
many men are found with a “mental disorder.”101 Within the DSM, there is a
general diagnosis of paraphilia, and the general diagnosis has various subcategories, including categories for rape, pedophilia, hebephilia, and other
sexual disorders.102 To rise to the level of sexual paraphilia, a person must
have “recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors” and act on them.103 A paraphilia generally describes these various
sexual illnesses, which become a “paraphilic disorder” when they cause
distress for a set amount of time.104 Some paraphilias are unquestionably
mental disorders under the SVPA when dealing with repeat offenders; i.e.,
pedophilia or rape (“non-consent”), and some paraphilias have their own
subcategory, i.e. sexual sadism disorder and sexual masochism disorder that
are arguably mental disorders.105 Yet there are other unspecified diagnoses, a
residual category called “paraphilia not otherwise specified” (hereinafter
“PNOS”), which are subject to interpretation.106
PNOS is a “catch-all” that implements many different mental illnesses
pursuant to the DSM, and various defendants argue that it is not a mental
disorder for purposes of the SVPA.107 However, the courts usually find this
diagnosis falls within the Act because there is widespread acceptance that
paraphilia is a mental disorder and the men who have it have life-long deviant
sexual behavior.108
As stated above, the court allows an expert to testify on just the mental
state, and psychologists often say the person has a mental disorder without
stipulating that a mental illness under the DSM may not rise to the level of a
mental disorder required for civil confinement under the SVPA. However, if
the jury only hears that the psychologist found a “mental disorder” and not
other discussion, it potentially convolutes the issue and the outcome. The

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

See DSM-V, supra note 13, at 302.89.
See id.
Hamilton, supra note 57.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See generally In re Detention of Melcher, 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
Hamilton, supra note 57, at 549.
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vague terminology an expert may use allows them to say “mental disorder”
when they really mean “mental illness,” but the judge and jury may not
recognize the difference between the opinion and the judgment of a legal
“mental disorder,” implying the statutory structure is vague.
Due to the subjectivity of diagnoses such as “paraphilia not otherwise
specified,” there is a mental illness diagnosed, but not a mental disorder. To
find a mental disorder through a psychologist’s opinion and testimony on the
person’s diagnosis for paraphilia, courts have found that a mental disorder
diagnosis based on sexual violence is largely scientific and based on reliable
tests and examinations.109 However, the tests and examinations psychologists
use often determine how much of the psychologist’s opinion is based in
scientific findings and how much is subjective.110
As an example of where findings may be subjective, psychologists often
use “paraphilia” as a way to determine sexual paraphilic disorders. However,
to exemplify for courts these may be mental disorders for the Act,
psychologists bolster paraphilia’s severity by finding other mental illnesses,
such as alcoholism.111 These extra findings not only convolute whether a
person has a mental disorder or not, but also give the jury and the judge
character traits that are unseemly and may be inherently prejudicial.112 Judges
and juries may have difficulty understanding a legal “mental disorder” and
harm the freedom of the man on trial.
The psychologist’s finding and exams use the DSM to diagnose a mental
illness, not for purposes of finding a legal mental disorder.113 To find
paraphilia, a psychologist first should show that it is a “mental disorder” for
purposes of the Act. Something as subjective as a psychological evaluation
needs to be analyzed to show a general acceptance in the field for the process
and diagnoses, especially in consideration of issues of civil confinement of
post-confinement criminals.114

109

See id.
See In re Detention of Melcher, 2 N.E.3d at 1191.
111
See infra Part III.A.
112
See generally Ill. R. Evid. 403.
113
The DSM uses the term “mental disorder,” but stipulates: “[a]s a result, it is important
to note that the definition of mental disorder included in DSM-V was developed to meet the
needs of clinicians, public health professionals, and research investigators rather than all of
the technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.” I am using “mental illness” as the
standard for the DSM for difference of “technical needs” in the court. DSM-V, supra note 13,
at xxxiii.
114
See Giannelli, supra note 97, at 114 (“APA’s best estimate is that two out of three
predictions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists are wrong.”) (internal citation
110
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III. FRYE IN ILLINOIS
Several courts recently examined if an expert’s opinion needs a Frye
hearing when establishing a man’s “mental disorder.”115 An Illinois court
recently found a Frye hearing necessary to determine whether an expert’s
opinion on a diagnosis was “new or novel” to establish a “mental disorder”
generally accepted in the medical field of psychologists.116 After this, other
Illinois courts began analyzing whether Frye hearings are appropriate to test
psychologists’ expert opinions.117 Although the courts initially began to
implement the Frye hearing with psychologist expert’s diagnoses, courts
have begun to “cabin” these results, stating the “judicial landscape”,”“ i.e.
years of trials showing general acceptance, shows psychologists generally
accept the questioned diagnoses.118
A. THE NEW PRECEDENT WITH IN RE NEW

Within the case In re New, New argued his diagnoses was not generally
accepted with the psychological field as a “mental disorder.”119 New had
multiple convictions for criminal sexual acts with minors.120 The attorney
general charged him under the SVPA before his release, and evidence
showed that he requested placement with a young inmate he once coached
and was attracted to.121 The court ruled the defendant had a paraphilia under
the category of attraction to post-pubescent children, along with issues of

omitted). The psychiatrist in the case mentioned found that the defendant had a 100% chance
of recidivism without meeting him, and the court found this was enough to commit him in a
criminal case. Id. Giannelli found this “shocks the conscience.” Id.
115
In re Detention of New, 992 N.E.2d 519, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). Appellate courts in
Illinois review de novo for legal determinations in the SVPA appeals, so appellate courts can
look not only at the record from the prior trial, but at other legal and scientific sources outside
the record, opinions, or jurisdictions. In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1189
(Ill. 2004).. Therefore, appellate courts review expert witnesses and examine the
psychologist’s tests, facts, and diagnoses. In re Detention of New, 992 N.E.2d at 527 (citing
In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d at 1184.
116
In re Detention of New, 992 N.E.2d at 528-29.
117
In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 598; In re Anderson, 11 N.E.3d 445 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014); In re Detention of Melcher; 2 N.E.3d 1181 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
118
See In re Detention of Melcher; 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
119
In re Detention of New, 992 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
120
In re Detention of New, 992 N.E.2d at 521-22. There were various ages, but New
always claimed he thought they looked older. Id. There was only one count that asserted it was
non-consensual when he fondled genitals of a “young looking” prison inmate he requested to
be placed with, but New later claimed it was consensual. Id. at 522.
121
Id.
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non-consent.122 The state psychiatrists took the diagnoses of paraphilia for
post-pubescent children and the issues of non-consent as a conjunctive issue,
rising to paraphilic disorder and mental disorder.123
In New, three psychologists assessed the defendant; however,124 the
difference between the state’s two psychologists and the defendant’s
psychologist was the fact that defendant’s psychologist argued the PNOS,
sexual attraction to sexually immature adolescents, was not a pathology, or
as stated in this Comment, a “mental disorder.”125 As stated in Part II.B, the
categorization of paraphilia in the DSM has eight specific sub-categories for
paraphilias and one residual category.126 The defendant used a psychologist’s
determination that, although the action was illegal, it is “normal for adults to
be sexually attracted to other adults and also to sexually immature adults.”127
Because it appeared “normal,” the defendant argued they needed a Frye
hearing to establish if the tests and analysis of the psychologists’ findings
actually rose to a “mental disorder.”
The Illinois Appellate Court found that a Frye hearing was necessary
because PNOS and its various subcategories were not “generally accepted in
the community.”128 The court wanted to see if PNOS was valid for a sexually
122

Id. at 519–521.
In re Detention of New, 992 N.E.2d at 525.
124
Id. at 522. Drs. Fogel and Brucker testified for the state and Dr. Witherspoon testified
for New. Dr. Fogel found New to be subject to PNOS, attraction to early pubescent males (11
to 14 years of age) and antisocial personality order using both the Static 99 and the Hare
Psychopathy Checklist Revised (both found to be high level of mental illness and potential for
recidivism). Id. at 523–25. Dr. Brucker examined as a licensed clinical psychologist found 5
different mental disorders: PNOS, sexually attracted to adolescent males, nonexclusive type,
and two through four with alcohol dependence or physiological dependence in a controlled
environment, cannabis dependence and cocaine abuse. Id. at 525. He administered the
Minnesota Mutiphasic personality Inventory II (MPPI-II); the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
Inventory III (MCMI-III); and the Mutliphasic Sex Inventory III. Id. He found that there was
a high risk of reoffending for future acts. Id. at 526. Dr. Witherspoon was a licensed
psychologist and expert in forensic psychology with the MCMI-III, the MnSOST, and various
tests, and found under these there was no mental disorder accepted in the field for the purposes
of the act. Id. Further, he tested him for risk assessment under the Sexual Violent Risk 20
(SVR 20) and the Static 2002R saying that they were more accurate. Id. He did not find New
in a high risk of re-offending category. Id. at 527.
125
Id. at 526 (“Witherspoon said that New’s history of sexual offenses did not indicate he
had a mental disorder because ‘‘it’s normal for adults to be sexually attracted to other adults
and also to sexually immature adolescents,’ and while illegal to act on those feelings, it is not
considered a pathology.”).
126
DSM-V, supra note 13; see supra Part II.B.
127
In re Detention of New, 992 N.E.2d. at 526
128
Id. at 527.
123
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violent person under a “mental disorder” in the legal sense, not only the
psychological sense.129 New determined that PNOS was “new or novel” in
part due to the psychologist’s use of it generally, along with other “mental
illnesses” such as alcoholism.130 The psychologist had found a mental
disorder because the PNOS was reinforced by New’s alcoholism to show he
could not control his impulses for sexual needs of underage teenagers, and
the court questioned if this was a valid assessment.131
The court focused on the differences in opinion and assessment of the
three psychologists,132 and because of their variation, the determination that
the general psychological community accepted PNOS as a mental disorder
lessened in its validity.133 In re New exemplifies courts’ newfound scrutiny
of whether a psychologist’s diagnosis of a mental illness under the DSM
actually rises to the level of a legally sufficient mental disorder.134
B. CARVING A NEW IN RE NEW

In In re New, the court found the psychologists’ views as expert
witnesses relied on a “new or novel concept” in diagnosing someone with
PNOS. However, numerous courts within Illinois have pushed back on this
decision, finding some PNOS determinations are generally accepted ,135
holding that inclusion of a version of PNOS in previous versions of the DSM
showed general acceptance by the psychological community,136 or reasoning
that a subset of acceptance in the psychological community indicated
acceptance.137
Although In re New established new ways to discuss PNOS under the
SVPA, many subsequent questions sought to limits the decision.138

129

Id.
Id. at 529.
131
Id. at 528.
132
Id. at 529.
133
In re New, 992 N.E.2d. 519, 531 (Ill. App. 2013).
134
See id.; see also In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 598 (Ill. 2013); In re Anderson, 11
N.E.3d 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
135
In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 598 (Ill. 2013); In re Anderson, 11 N.E.3d 445 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2014).
136
In re Melcher, 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
137
See, e.g., In re Fields, 10 N.E.3d 832 (Ill. 2014); In re Hayes, 8 N.E.3d 650 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2013).
138
See, e.g., In re Melcher. 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct 1st Dist. 2013); In re Fields,
10 N.E.3d 832 (Ill. 2014); In re Hayes, 8 N.E.3d 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); In re Stanbridge,
980 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. 2013).
130
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Subsequent cases often cabin the case to allow Frye hearings only in cases
involving the specific diagnosis used in In re New: PNOS attraction to postpubescent males.139 Courts often refuse to take PNOS’s other categories as
new or novel mental conditions, hinging on the fact that PNOS was a new
diagnosis in recent DSM versions.140 Because courts have accepted
psychologists’ diagnoses and the reliance on other paraphilias (i.e. sadism,
rape, etc.), courts fail to distinguish between these viable paraphilias that rise
to mental disorder and the mental illnesses under the general PNOS
standard.141
In In re Stanbridge, two defendants were charged under the SVPA, and
the attorney general relied on expert testimony regarding diagnoses of
“paraphilia, not otherwise specified, sexually attracted to nonconsenting
persons,” i.e., showing both men had convictions for rape and were
diagnosed with having an attraction to nonconsensual sex.142 The Supreme
Court of Illinois upheld the lower court’s finding that the expert could testify
the person had a compulsion and an attraction to rape under its subsection of
PNOS, and the jury could use this as sufficient to find a “mental disorder.”143
In rendering the decision, the court did not touch on In re New in the Frye
context, focusing instead on the issues of probable cause in the trial and if
there was enough evidence for an SVPA finding.144
The court’s holding in In re Stanbridge addresses the issue with PNOS:
PNOS includes diagnoses like the urge to rape, something that is strongly
associated with a mental disorder.145 Because rape is involved with PNOS
but does not involve the residual “catch-all” category, courts are often
uncertain where to draw the lines in the different subcategories of PNOS:
what is a mental disorder and what is merely mental illness. 146
Courts permit diagnoses like inability to control a need to rape to justify
139

See, e.g., In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 605; In re Melcher, 2 N.E.3d at 1195.
See, e.g., In re Melcher. 2 N.E.3d at 1195; In re Fields, 10 N.E.3d 832 (Ill. 2014); In
re Hayes, 8 N.E.3d 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. 2013).
141
See, e.g., In re Melcher. 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013).
142
In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 602, 605.
143
Id. at 619.
144
Id.
145
DSM-V, supra note 13.
146
See In re Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 606 (“DSM specifically identifies nine common
paraphilic conditions and lists the diagnostic criteria for each condition. In addition, the DSM
includes a residual category of ‘paraphilia not otherwise specified’ for paraphilias that do not
meet the criteria for any of the nine specifically listed categories. That residual section
provides a nonexhaustive list of examples that fall under this catch-all NOS category.”
(emphasis added)).
140
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a general acceptance of all psychological diagnoses that fall under the PNOS
“mental illness” scheme. In In re Melcher, the court found a consensus in
judicial thought in Illinois and other states that PNOS was generally accepted
within the psychological community.147 The Melcher court found no need for
a Frye hearing because of the expansive acceptance of the PNOS diagnoses
preceding In re New, an acceptance they termed as the “judicial
landscape”.148
In In re Melcher, the defendant argued that an expert’s opinion that
Melcher had PNOS required a Frye hearing because the specific diagnosis of
“PNOS nonconsent” (what was previously used to diagnose rape) was
removed from the two newest versions of the DSM.149 The court found the
DSM-IV, the APA, and the general psychology community accepted “PNOS
nonconsent” because the paraphilia section contained a description of
nonconsent.150 The court read “nonconsenting person” in a general
description of the new version of paraphilias, so it applied the diagnosis as if
the DSM had not changed and accepted it as a mental illness.151 The “judicial
landscape” argument looked at all other courts that had not questioned such
diagnoses and found, based on the lack of question, there was no reason to
go further in its analysis for Frye hearings.152
This finding is inconsistent with the legal definition of mental disorder,
for rape has always been unquestionably a mental disorder if the person
cannot control it.153 Further, the court could have ignored In re New due to a
case like In re Stanbridge that hinted rape was an unquestionable mental
disorder. However, the court dangerously implemented a “judicial
landscape” argument: that as long as there had been acceptance by the courts,
it was acceptable to implement the expert’s testimony.154 The judicial
landscape approach ignored the reasons for Frye hearings introduced in In re
New and the core argument of this Comment: the DSM discusses mental
illnesses; it is not a bright line rule for “mental disorders” under the SVPA.155
147
In re Melcher. 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013) (looking at former
precedent within the courts).
148
Id.
149
See In re Melcher, 2 N.E.3d at 1193.
150
Id. at 1194.
151
Id. at 1195.
152
Id.
153
See supra notes 5–8 & accompanying text. Not all men who do a subsequent crime
have a mental disorder—it depends on his control of the mental illness. Id.
154
Melcher, 2 N.E.3d at 1195.
155
Contra In re Hayes, 8 N.E.3d 650, 655–56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
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The fact that the Supreme Court and the appellate courts in Illinois
analyzed the DSM at all shows the danger of using psychiatric decisions
versus legal definition. Using the DSM as a legal determination of mental
disorders is extremely problematic considering due process and judicial
process. The judiciary is charged to make sure that the court makes decisions
applying fact to law. If a descriptive tool with no legal justification is used as
a legal authority, people now are in custody who are not legally SVPs. The
potential for erroneous findings with the DSM and the issue of fairness
became extremely apparent in In re Walker, where the court found that it was
sufficient to find that a subset of experts reasonably relied on the method
implemented by the psychologists to diagnose the defendant under the
DSM.156
The Walker court held In re New was wrong because it assumed a
“majority” of psychologists needed to accept the diagnoses before it became
accurate.157 The acceptance of a “majority decision” stood on outdated law
based on federal circuit cases.158 Further, the case law relied on a case before
In re New. However, the court still found PNOS applicable because a subset
of courts allowed the finding in expert testimony.159
Courts have made the DSM determinations arbitrary, accepting the
DSM as a proverbial bible and yet ignoring the standards the DSM
implemented in analyzing a person. The DSM has standards for how old a
person has to be for a mental illness to instill in them and certain lengths of
time an illness needs to be ongoing before it is onset. Courts convoluted
these requirements of the DSM, finding that the age prescribed under the
DSM for mental disorders to begin is not as important as the mental disorders
themselves.160
In In re Fields, the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed whether the
defendant could be diagnoses with paraphilic disorder despite not reaching
the age criteria for such a diagnosis under the DSM; the court found it could

156
In re Walker, 19 N.E.3d 205, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2014); see also In re Melcher,
2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2013).
157
In re Walker, 19 N.E.3d at 227.
158
Id. at 226.
159
Id.
160
See In re Anderson, 11 N.E.3d 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (affirming trial court finding
Anderson was an SVP for purposes of the act because his consensual and nonconsensual
relationships with boys between the ages of 15–18 when only had one relationship with a child
that did not rise to the level of pedophilia when he was much younger under the influence of
drugs).
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overlook such age requirements.161 The defendant charged under the SVPA
in In re Fields argued that he was only fifteen years and eight months old
during his first incident of paraphilic disorder and the DSM specifically states
mental illness can only be established at age sixteen.162 The court found that
the DSM also states onsets can begin earlier, so the court ignored the sixteenage mark.163 The court failed to differentiate that onset signs do not signify
an actual mental disorder or even a mental illness. Because the court relied
on the expert testimony regarding “mental disorder” using the DSM, it would
logically follow that a person would fall within the DSM age ranges. The age
limit shows a bright line rule for courts to follow, so it begs the question why
criteria for diagnoses were ignored. In re Fields shows the importance the
court places on DSM rules when the rules do not work against a defendant.
How to determine whether a particular medical condition is “new or
novel” for the Frye hearing in the SVPA today is unclear after cases like In
re Melcher, In re Walker, and In re Fields. The “judicial landscape” blanket
acceptance of the psychologist’s view using DSM convolutes how a person
can prove he does not have a mental disorder.164 They ignore the real issue:
whether a psychologist’s diagnosis of a mental illness under the DSM rises
to the level of a mental disorder.
C. THE NEW IN RE NEW

Although the “judicial landscape” argument is beneficial to those
opposing Frye, the Supreme Court of Illinois recently upheld the ruling of In
re New in 2014.165 The Supreme Court of Illinois focused on the term of
hebephilia used by the psychologists in In re New, i.e. attraction to adolescent
males,166 and held this was not a generally accepted term within the
psychological field.167 To do this, the court noted that “a particular diagnosis
may be so devoid of content, or so near-universal in its rejection by mental

161

In re Fields, 10 N.E.3d 832, 840–41 (Ill. 2014).
Id. at 833, see also DSM-V, supra note 13.
163
Id. at 838, 840.
164
See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 10–11, In re Mohr, No. 2013 MR 59 (3d Dist. Ill.
2014); rev’d for Frye hearing. Alison Fagermen argues that hebaphilia are different things and
psychologists cannot find a similar mental disorder with the different linguistics. Ms.
Fagerman moves on to argue that federal courts do not recognize hebaphilia and NOS was
never meant to be a mental disorder. Id.
165
Id.; see also 21 N.E.3d 406, 412 (Ill. 2014) (noting that mental diagnoses and
syndromes are subject to the Frye hearing).
166
Id. at 407.
167
Id. at 414.
162
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health professionals, that a court’s reliance on it to satisfy the ‘mental
disorder’ prong of the statutory requirements for commitment would violate
due process.”168
The court in In re New focused on the fact that in Kansas v. Hendricks,
the U.S. Supreme Court found it important to “distinguish[] between the
dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment, and other dangerous,
but typical, recidivists, who are more properly dealt with through the criminal
system.”169 The Illinois Supreme Court noted that Hendricks only held that
the statute did not violate due process because the person had a “serious
mental disorder.”170 To uphold the expert’s opinion in the case, civil
confinement needed to be “recognized by the mental health community.”171
Conditions unsupported by science “should be excluded from consideration
by the trier of fact.”172 Because the condition did not seem supported, the
Supreme Court found “[the] psychologist’s mental disorders [were] relevant
to [the] Frye standard.”173
The Illinois Supreme Court in In re New looked only at hebephilia, but
it noted that diagnoses not generally accepted in the community need more
evidence that they gained general acceptance.174 The court focused on the fact
that DSM expansion needed studies and research to show “[statistical]
reliability, and a full and open debate about its conceptual validity.”175
The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in In re New aims to expand the
use of Frye and demonstrates that psychologists’ diagnoses should
sometimes be “excluded from consideration by the trier of fact.”176 The
Illinois Supreme Court’s decision held that the DSM often changes and
evolves, so a Frye hearing is necessary for determining if the terms and
studies are still accepted within the community.177 In In re New, the Supreme
Court of Illinois noted that the psychologist’s ultimate conclusion is not the
focus of a Frye hearing, but “the scientific principle, test, or technique used
168

In re New, 21 N.E.3d 406, 412 (2014) (emphasis added); quoting McGee v. Bartow,
593 F.3d 556, 577 (7th Cir. 2010).
169
Id. at 412.
170
Id. at 413 (internal citation omitted).
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 417.
175
In re New, 21 N.E.3d at 413 (internal citation omitted).
176
21 N.E.3d. at 413.
177
In re New, 21 N.E.3d at 417 (citing In re Melcher, 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct.
2013); In re Hayes, 8 N.E.3d 650, 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
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to generate that conclusion.”178 This reading should be expanded, for the
DSM needs to be tested with Frye not only when the DSM gets rid of a
diagnoses, but also to analyze a “mental disorder.” In re New shows that the
DSM does have updates and changes, and therefore should be tested in a
more general manner.
In re New reinforces that the DSM’s definition of “mental disorder” is
not important, but the tests and theories that define people with the “mental
disorder” under the SVPA are. Because the DSM changes, the mental
disorders and illnesses tests in it should be studied and explicated to reinforce
the due process and validity of the reliance on the different findings. It should
not merely be that because the person has a diagnosis of PNOS under the
DSM, it is a “catch-all” for the SVPA.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF FRYE IN ACTUARIAL RISK ASSESSMENT TESTS
The state must prove not only that a person has a mental disorder, but
also that he is a danger for recidivism and likely will commit further acts.
Psychologists implement actuarial assessments to test future recidivism that
are subject to Frye hearings even though they are more scientific and
objective. 179 To diagnose someone with a risk of recidivism, many
psychiatrists implement actuarial assessments to try to assure accuracy,
admissibility, and accountability.180
To view the risk assessments, psychologists rely on for their expert
testimonies, courts often allow evaluations based on Actuarial Risk
Assessment tests (hereinafter “ARAs”).181 Courts allow psychologists to use
these tests to reinforce their clinical opinions. Experts rely on these to

178

In re New, 21 N.E.3d at 412 (citation omitted).
See People v. Taylor, 830 N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Eric S. Janus & Robert
A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy,
Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1455 (2003).
180
See generally Janus & Prentky, supra note 179, at 1495–96. This is to make sure there
is risk assessment in recidivism. Id. However, the actual studies and different aspects are fairly
subjective to what the psychiatrist wishes to put in as a factor. Id. at 1485. It mixes empirical
data such as age, weight, along with the psychiatrists view on the person’s mental state, home
life, and their level of manipulation. Id. at 1455. These subjective thoughts mixed with
empirical data show that the risk assessment is not perfect for finding out a person is not able
to maintain life in society. Id.
181
These tests include those implemented into the In re New case. Tests take “empirically
derived ‘mechanical’ rules for combining information to produce a quantitative estimate of
risk.” Janus & Prentky, supra note 179, at 1444. ARAs are used “using statistical analyses of
groups of individuals . . . with known outcomes during a “follow period.” Id. at 1453. The
“predictor variables” help differentiate people in danger of reoffending. Id.
179
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determine whether recidivism is more likely than not, but these tests have
their own risks.182 The ARAs were developed in the 1970s, extremely recent
to be fully accurate within the field, and courts have only relied on them in
the past two decades for opinions.183
Scholars argue that ARAs are better than clinical assessments by
psychologists because of their measurable factors which are more reliable
than a subjective test influenced by psychologist biases.184 Courts in Illinois
often ultimately allow ARAs after a Frye hearing because the evidence is
“transpar[ent]” and “demystify[ing]”.185 ARAs are more quantifiable and
therefore more reliable because they are based on statistics and numerical
factors.186 Psychologists use numerous ARAs in the recidivism, actuarial
context; however, the Illinois courts have found each falls within the need for
a Frye hearing due to their changes and updates and a psychologist’s choice
on what factors affect recidivism.187 Because a clinical assessment is even
more dispositive and based on a psychologist’s biases, thought process, and
reliance on DSM as a mental disorder device, the subjective tests for mental
disorders should rise to the level for the recidivism tests. One Frye hearing
should follow another.
V. NEW NEEDS FOR FRYE
Evidence at trial should make “any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.”188 Under the current regime, a court allows a
psychologist’s expert opinion, the psychologist says he diagnosed the

182
Id. The largest tests used in Illinois include Re risk assessment, the static 99-R, and the
static 2002. The tests are argued against as outdated, historically used upon with questionable
reliability. Some doctors also use Stable 2007, the pcl-r, the mats-1 to assess risk of recidivism.
With each test the psychologist gets to use his own preference for which test exemplifies the
answer he wishes. The numerous tests and numerous conclusions accepted in courts without
the Frye test shows that people are not being found on the larger scale for purposes of the
SVPA.
183
Id. at 1453. Tests developed in a “‘second generation’ of empirical research on risk
assessment” due to worries on clinical reliability. Id.
184
Janus & Prentky, supra note 179, at 1453.
185
Id. at 1450, 1452.
186
Id. at 1464–65. (Describing the measurability, the empirical basis, and the precision
that comes with the adequacy of measuring different issues. Further, goes to the authenticity
and the transparency instead of clinical risk assessment).
187
See People v. Taylor, 830 N.E.2d 855, 857 (ll. App. Ct. 2005); Janus & Prentky, supra
note 179, at 1455.
188
Ill. R. Evid. 401.
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defendant under the DSM with a mental illness and it is a mental disorder,
and the court often accepts it and moves on to the ARAs. Psychologists use
both the ARAs and the clinical assessments to demonstrate that a person
should remain in confinement under the SVPA; however, various clinical
studies show jury members are less attentive to ARAs than to clinical
assessments.189 Thus, the jury gives the most weight to the evidence that is
less objective and which has not been vetted by a judge for methodological
integrity. This situation reinforces the need for a Frye hearing for diagnoses
of mental illness under the DSM to ensure that the court keeps out any
unreliable evidence that biases the jury. Prophylactic material ensures a
person’s due process is protected before information reaches the jury.190
Because the SVPA deals with men who will be placed into indefinite
civil confinement, it is especially important to keep due process checks in
place. Due process requires that the proper court processes and rules are
followed and—in the end—accurately find whether a man is more likely than
not to have a mental disorder. This helps the overall goal of the SVP: to make
sure those who cannot control their mental disorder can remain behind bars.
If the due process checks are not in place, the overall goal is thwarted and
instead men are placed in long-term confinement who are not intended to fall
under the statute and its purposes.
Once a person goes to trial, society’s prejudices come in, for an SVPA
due to a man’s convictions of rape, attraction to younger children, child
pornography, etc.191 These charges are inherently seen as evil in society, and
there is a large chance he is judged based on these prior acts instead of his
mental disorder.192 A prophylactic tool such as a Frye hearing allows a judge
to examine the psychologist’s test, and stop bad testimony from unjustly
affecting a person’s trial.
189

See generally Nicholas Scurich and Daniel Krauss, The Effects of Adjusted Actuarial
Risk Assessment on Mock-Jurors’ Decisions in a Sexual Predator Commitment Proceeding,
53 Jurimetrics J. 395 (2013). This document discussed the facts of jury matters and found that
a jury was more likely to convict if they had little information about the person’s mental issues
or if there was a clinical assessment, but less likely to convict if there was an assessment of
low mental disorder or recidivism.
190
See, e.g., In re Fields, 10 N.E.3d 832 (Ill. 2014); In re Hayes, 8 N.E.3d 650 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2014); In re Melcher, 2 N.E.3d 1181, 1195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
191
See Lave, supra note 25, at 216; quoting Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction:
Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 32 (University of Chicago Press 2008)
(noting the clinical diagnosis “accentua[tes] the prejudices and biases that are built into the
criminal code”).
192
See, e.g. Janus & Polachek, supra note 80, at 154, 155–164 (discussing the disconnect
between preconceived notions of sexual offenders and the reality of sexually violent persons).
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The Frye hearing provides necessary prophylactics to ensure that a
diagnosis is based on accepted scientific principles before the court makes a
finding that a person is an SVP. It examines if the expert uses proper
classification, ensures due process within the courts, and ensures a good
diagnosis for purposes of the Act, in particular distinguishing between mental
illnesses and mental disorders. Under the proposed new model, psychologists
can still use the DSM for its purpose of diagnosing a mental illness, and use
circumstances and proper tests to suggest this rises to the level of mental
disorder.
In addition, studies have shown that psychologists’ focus on alcoholism,
antisocial disorder, and other mental disorders has little to do with a man’s
mental disorder.193 Therefore, when these different disorders are used, the
court or jury may mistakenly assume a man’s deviant behavior to be
something that makes him inherently sexually dangerous.194 Clinical
assessments linked to specific assessments, not subjective testimony, often
fare better in predicting a man’s likelihood for recidivism or what issues he
may have.195 A Frye hearing can stop clinical assessments from delving too
deeply into prejudicial information, and instead look to whether the person
does or does not fall under the mental disorder requirement of the SVPA.
Courts and juries should accept the American Psychiatric Association’s
(hereinafter “APA”) understanding of the DSM: the APA does not wish to
help the court with “impure aims” of judging someone based on social
delinquencies.196 The APA only uses the DSM as a diagnostic tool for mental
illness within the field.197 Courts should recognize psychologists are medical
experts who use the DSM as a starting point to determine whether a person
has a mental illness, not whether he has a legally defined “mental disorder.”

193

In re New, 992 N.E.2d 519, 526 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). See generally Lave, supra note
25, at 231 (“[F]actors that would seem to be intuitively linked to risk, are not. For example,
denial of the charges and low treatment motivation were not linked to recidivism. Nor were
general psychological problems, alcohol abuse, or childhood sexual abuse a predictor for
reoffending. Facts related to the crime like low victim empathy and degree of sexual contact
were also unassociated with recidivism.”
194
Id. at 257 (““According to a task force of the American Psychiatric Association, ‘Only
the paraphilic diagnoses focus directly on psychopathological features of deviant sexual
behavior, but these conditions appear to be absent in most offenders. In contrast, a significant
number of sex offenders may have substance abuse or personality disorder diagnoses, but these
conditions usually have little explanatory connection to the offender’s sexual behavior.”
(citing Task Force Report, supra note 19, at 9).
195
Id. at 230-32.
196
See DSM-V Development: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 13, at 71.
197
See id.
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CONCLUSION
Civil confinement is a dangerous sword. It allows men to be incarcerated
after they have served their punishment. Because it is a sword, courts should
ensure that there are procedural protections at every level of the incarceration.
The person is kept in DHS until new evidence shows he is safe for society.198
Due to this high threshold, there should be some type of procedure to make
sure they are protected through due process. Although the subject deals with
criminals who are seen as the lowest in society, we should not use this as a
justification to punish them more. Courts need prophylactic measures to
ensure justice, reliability, and accuracy. With the Frye hearing, the original
purpose of the SVPA is reinforced.

198

See supra Section I.D.

